Cancer and the Levels of Selection by Okasha, Samir
Cancer and the Levels of Selection
Samir Okasha
Abstract
Cancer is often seen as a case of multilevel selection, in which selfish
cancer cells pursue short-term proliferation to the detriment of the
collective. Thus cancer cells are described as ‘cheats’, and an analogy
is often drawn between the mechanisms by which organisms fight can-
cer and the mechanisms by which social groups enforce cooperation.
Recently, Gardner ([2015a]) and Shpak and Lu ([2016]) have argued
that cancer is not a true case of multilevel selection, that cancer cells
should be not regarded as cheats, and that the analogy between anti-
cancer adaptations and suppression mechanisms in social groups is
misleading. Their arguments are powerful. However, by drawing on
the (presumed) link between cancer and the evolution of multicellu-
larity, the notion that cancer represents a form of selective conflict
between cells and organisms can be salvaged.
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According to Wikipedia,‘cancer is a classic example of what evolutionary bi-
ologists call multilevel selection’.1 The article goes on to explain that since
cancer is usually fatal for an individual organism,‘there is selection for genes
and the organization of tissues that suppress cancer; but since cancerous cells
typically proliferate faster than other somatic cells within an organism,‘at the
level of the cell there is selection for cancer’. The suggestion, then, is that
cancer is an instantiation of a well-known evolutionary scenario, in which nat-
ural selection operates at more than one level of a hierarchically-organized
system. Such scenarios are the subject matter of ‘multilevel selection theory’,
a branch of evolutionary biology with diverse applications.2 In a typical mul-
tilevel scenario, replicating ‘particles’ are nested within ‘collectives’, which
often leads to evolutionary conflict. For a trait that is advantageous at the
particle level may be disadvantageous at the collective level or vice-versa, in
which case the direction of selection will be different at each level. In the
case of cancer, the levels in question are the cellular and the organismic; the
suggestion is that cancerous cell lineages, by escaping the normal constraints
on cell division, enjoy a short-term selective advantage despite long-term
detriment to the organism.
It is true that many biologists see cancer as a case of multilevel selection,
just as Wikipedia says.3 Indicative of this is the widespread tendency to
apply concepts and descriptors from social evolution theory (of which mul-
tilevel selection is a part) to cancer. Thus for example, malignant cells in a
neoplasm are described as ‘selfish’ or ‘cheaters’, seeking to benefit themselves
at the expense of the collective, by contrast with the ‘cooperative’ behavior
of normal somatic cells.4 The language of selfishness, cheating and cooper-
ation has its original home in the study of animal social behaviour, but in
principle applies whenever there is conflict between levels of selection. The
same is true of the term ‘policing mechanism’, which in the case of cancer has
been used to describe the means by which organisms try to prevent cancerous
1‘Somatic evolution in cancer’ in Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia.
2For discussions of multilevel selection, see (Sober and Wilson [1998]; Frank [1998];
Gould [2002]; Okasha [2006]; Godfrey-Smith [2009]; Goodnight [2013]; Gardner [2015a]).
3Examples include (Buss [1987]; Greaves [2015]; Aktipis and Nesse [2013]; Aktipis
[2020]; Maley and Reid [2005]; Goodnight [2013]).
4Cancer is described in these terms by (Burt and Trivers [2006], Chapter 11; Ratcliff
et al. [2012]; Nelson and Masel [2017]; Aktipis and Maley [2017]; Inglis et al. [2017]).
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cells from arising or spreading, such as programmed cell death and immune
system destruction of nascent tumours. This invites an analogy with the
policing that goes on in social insect colonies, for example, when workers eat
the eggs laid by other workers to ensure that only the queen’s progeny are
reared.5 When cancer is described in these terms, then even if the multilevel
selection framework is not explicit, it is effectively presupposed.
The tendency to view cancer in this way, as the result of conflict be-
tween levels of selection, is manifest not just in the language biologists use
but also in the explanations they give. For example, it is often argued that
the abnormal behaviour of cancer cells, though puzzling at first sight, be-
comes explicable once we realize that they differ genetically from normal
somatic cells, thanks to mutations and / or chromosomal re-arrangements.6
According to this argument, the cooperation of the cells in an organism is
the default expectation, given that they derive from a single zygote, but can-
cerous cells, being mutants, are exceptions. This argument invokes one of
the central principles of social evolution theory, namely that clonally related
units have identical evolutionary interests so will be selected to cooperate,
while genetically different units usually will not.
In recent articles, Gardner ([2015a], [2015b]) and Shpak and Lu ([2016])
both reject the idea that cancer represents a bona fide case of multilevel
selection, on the grounds that cancer cells are an evolutionary dead-end.
Gardner observes that a cancerous cell lineage in an organism dies out when
its host organism dies, apart from in the extremely rare cases of transmis-
sible tumours (only two such cases are known.7) So despite its short-term
proliferative advantage, a cancer cell leaves no descendants in the next or-
ganismic generation, so makes no contribution to the future of the gene
pool. Thus the idea that there is selection for cancer at the cell level, but
against it at the individual level, is flawed, Gardner argues. Shpak and Lu
([2016]) endorse Gardner’s critique; in addition, they argue that cancer is
5This analogy is explicit in (Aktipis [2020]; Aktipis and Maley [2017]; Goodnight
[2013]).
6For example, Crespi and Summers ([2005]) write ‘cells within the metazoan body
are, for the most part, genetically identical; thus, they have evolved an altruistic division
of labor represented by diverse, specialized and integrated types of tissue. By contrast,
the somatic selection of cancer is driven by differential replication of cells that differ
phenotypically as a result of genetic mutation and epigenetic alteration (p. 545)’.
7These occur in the domestic dog (Canis lupus familiaris) and the Tasmanian devil
(Sarcophilus harrisii) (Murchison [2008]). Shpak and Lu ([2016]) also mention heritable
tumourigenic mutations in plants.
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fundamentally dissimilar from paradigm cases of multilevel selection, as for
example a transposon that reduces its host organism’s fitness but spreads by
inserting multiple copies of itself in the genome. Thus biologists are wrong
to see cancer ‘as a case study in conflict between two classes of replicating
entities—cells and organisms’, they argue (p. 42). This leads Shpak and Lu
to reject the idea that cancer cells are usefully thought of as ‘cheaters’, and
to reject as misleading the analogy between the mechanisms by which organ-
isms suppress cancer and the policing mechanisms found in social groups for
suppressing defectors.
This evolutionary dead-end argument—hereafter the EDA—poses a prima
facie challenge to the view that cancer involves conflict between levels of se-
lection. Do proponents of that view—who of course know that cancer is usu-
ally non-transmissible—have the wherewithal to respond to the challenge?
And if the EDA is decisive, then what exactly needs to change? Merely the
language that some biologists have used to describe cancer, or something
more substantive? These are the questions that I tackle in this paper.
I think of this as a quintessentially philosophy-of-science matter. For the
disagreement is not, or not primarily, about how and why cancer occurs,
but rather about the validity of a certain conceptual framework for thinking
about cancer. Thus the key question is not of the form ‘what are the empirical
facts?’, but rather ‘what would the empirical facts have to be like, in order for
the levels-of-selection framework to be applicable?’. The answer that Gardner
and Shpak and Lu give is that cancer would have to be transmissible—as it
usually is not. But there are other possible answers too, some of which seem
to be implicitly held by those who conceptualize cancer in multilevel selection
terms. They include: (i) that the clonal evolution model of carcinogenesis
would have to be true; (ii) that the theory of Buss ([1987]) on the origins of
multicellularity would have to be true; and (iii) that the so-called ‘atavistic
interpretation’ of cancer would have to be true. Each of (i)-(iii) constitutes
a potential response to the EDA and needs to be carefully evaluated.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 distinguishes the
multilevel selection view of cancer from a number of other ways in which
evolutionary ideas have been brought to bear on cancer, including the clonal
evolution model. Section 3 considers the EDA in more detail and discusses
some possible responses. Section 4 deals with the relation between cancer
and the evolution of multicellularity. Buss’s theory and the atavistic inter-
pretation are discussed, and their potential to deal with the challenge posed
by the EDA is assessed. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Evolution and Cancer
That evolution can shed light on cancer is uncontroversial. In fact, three dis-
tinct ways of applying evolutionary principles to cancer can be distinguished,
each of which has led to insights. Firstly, evolutionary theory can be used to
explain the population-wide incidence of inherited germ-line mutations that
are known to increase cancer risk, such as the BRAC1 gene implicated in
breast cancer. Since such mutations are harmful for organisms, the challenge
is to explain why natural selection has not eliminated them. Possible answers
include recurrent mutation; antagonistic pleiotropy (a mutation having two
opposing effects on fitness); a mismatch between ancestral and modern envi-
ronments (such as fair-skinned people living in sunny climates); and others.
Note that the type of natural selection at work, when Darwinian evolution is
invoked in this context, is ‘ordinary’ selection between individual organisms
based on their heritable traits, in this case propensity to develop cancer.
That selection of this sort occurs is beyond doubt; but it is of fairly limited
significance in explaining the prevalence of cancer, given that many more
cancers result from somatic mutations and / or epigenetic changes than from
germ-line mutations.
Secondly, evolution can be used to understand the various adaptations
that organisms have for preventing cancer from arising or spreading. These
include tumour suppression mechanisms such as DNA repair, apoptosis, and
regulation of cell division; inhibition of metastasis via cell adhesion; immune
system destruction of cancer cells; tissue architecture that impedes the spread
of cancerous cells, such as colonic crypts; a reduced somatic mutation rate
in stem cells, for example via non-random DNA strand segregation8; and
more. The evolutionary logic here is again straightforward. Cancer, what-
ever its proximate cause, is a major source of mortality; and if it strikes
before reproductive age, constitutes a powerful selective pressure. So we
should expect organisms to evolve adaptations to combat it. When invoked
in this context, Darwinian evolution is playing its standard explanatory role,
namely explaining certain organismic attributes in terms of their adaptive
significance, namely cancer prevention.
8This is the idea, first advanced by Cairns ([1975]), that dividing stem cells do not seg-
regate DNA strands randomly into daughter cells but preferentially allocate the (ancestral)
template strand to the daughter stem cells. This potentially reduces the rate of mutation
accumulation in tissues. See (Werner and Sottoriva [2018]) for a recent discussion.
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Thirdly, and in sharp contradistinction to the above, there is the idea that
tumour development itself is an evolutionary process, involving selective com-
petition between cell lineages within the lifespan of a single organism. This
idea, propounded in particular by Nowell ([1976]), is now widely accepted in
both the medical and evolutionary literatures, where it is often referred to as
the ‘clonal evolution’ or ‘somatic evolution’ model of cancer.9 The basic idea
is that a neoplasm can be thought of as a large population of heterogeneous
cells, differing both genetically and epigenetically, some of which are better
at surviving and reproducing than others. This cellular population meets
the basic requirements for Darwinian evolution—variation, heritability and
fitness differences—where ‘fitness’ here refers to cell fitness, as measured by
proliferation rate. Thus faster-dividing cells outcompete their rivals within
the neoplasm, leading to clonal expansion. (Neutral processes may play a
role too.) Further mutations then arise, providing more fuel for selection,
and the process repeats, leading to progressive development of a tumour.
The clonal evolution view of cancer is no mere superficial application of
Darwinism. On the contrary, it has genuine explanatory power.10 All of the
famous ‘hallmarks of cancer’ identified by Hanahan and Weinberg ([2000],
[2011]), such as resistance to apoptosis, inducing angiogenesis and evading
growth suppressors, can be viewed as complex adaptations that cancer cells
have evolved (somatically) via multiple rounds of mutation and selection, as
a number of authors have noted.11 Thus a Darwinian perspective allows us
to understand these cellular phenotypes in terms of their adaptive signifi-
cance at the cell level. Moreover, the clonal evolution view helps explains
why tumours invariably evolve resistance to cytotoxic chemotherapy. The
explanation is that the introduction of chemotherapetic drugs alters the se-
lective microenvironment, so when mutation throws up a resistant cell it will
undergo rapid clonal expansion. As is well known, this is similar to how
bacteria evolve resistance to antibiotics, which is a bona fide Darwinian pro-
cess. And finally, phylogenetic studies of tumour development, that study
the pattern of descent of the cell clones within a single tumour, have recently
flourished; this underscores the fact that tumourigenesis is a genuinely evo-
9Morange ([2012]) notes that the idea in fact has a considerably older pedigree, tracing
to the work of Boveri ([1914]).
10Though see (Germain [2012]) for an interesting argument to the contrary, based on
Godfrey-Smith’s ([2009]) notion of a ‘marginal Darwinian population’.
11This argument is found in (Merlo et al. [2006]; Greaves [2015]; Lean and Plutynski
[2016]; Fortunato et al. [2017]), among others.
6
lutionary phenomenon.12
Recently, the clonal evolution model has been contrasted with an alter-
native model of carcinogensis known as the cancer stem cell (CSC) model
(Germain [2012]; Laplane [2018]). According to the CSC model, cancer cells
fall into two distinct sub-populations: CSCs, which have effectively unlimited
proliferative ability, and non-CSCs, which can divide at most a handful of
times before cell death. So only those mutations that arise in CSCs can give
rise to a clonal population that will persist. On the CSC model, Darwinian
competition between rival sub-clones in a tumour plays a less important role,
since most sub-clones will die out anyway. The empirical validity of the CSC
model is a topic of ongoing research, but even if it is validated, this would
not disprove the clonal evolution model outright (Plutynski [2020]). For the
two models represent ends of a continuum, not hard-and-fast alternatives,
and it seems probable that different cancers will lie at different points on
that continuum.
I assume, then, that the clonal evolution model of cancer is empirically
well-founded. But importantly, this does not in itself vindicate the idea that
cancer is a case of multilevel selection. For on the clonal evolution view, the
cell-level selection is between variant cancer cell lineages within a neoplasm.
It is this that explains why malignant cells acquire the hallmarks of cancer,
develop resistance to chemotherapy, and why phylogenetic analysis works.
But on the multilevel selection view, cancer is depicted as a conflict between
selection at the levels of the cell and the organism; so the relevant form of
within-organism selection would have to be between cancerous cell lineages
and normal somatic cell lineages, which is a different matter. That selection
of this latter sort occurs is not a crazy proposition. After all, we know
that within the tumour microenvironment, cancerous cells do compete with
neighbouring somatic cells, by diverting resources away from them and co-
opting their activities for their own purposes (for example, hijacking blood
vessels). Cell-lineage competition of this sort could be (and sometimes is)
interpreted as a form of Darwinian selection, in which cancer cells are the
‘winners’ and somatic cells the ‘losers’.13 But crucially, such competition
involves only the small subset of somatic cells that interact directly with
cancer cells. The existence of such competition, therefore, does not vindicate
12See (Schwartz and Schäffer [2017]) for a review of cancer phylogenetics.
13Cell competition is described in Darwinian terms in (Moreno and Rhiner [2014]) and
(Claveria and Torres [2016]).
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the notion of a ubiquitous evolutionary conflict between cancerous cells and
normal somatic cells, for that notion would only apply if there was a bona
fide Darwinian selection process acting on the total population of cells in the
organism. Perhaps it is defensible to envisage such a process. We return to
this issue later; for the moment the point is just that the empirical success
of the clonal evolution model does not settle the matter.
At this juncture, it is worth noting that advocates of the clonal evolu-
tion model have sometimes invoked multilevel selection in a quite different
way from that which is our main concern here. Two examples will illus-
trate. Firstly, Aktipis et al. ([2015]) argue that in advanced metastatic
cancer, there is often a metapopulation of genetically distinct cell colonies
(or clones); and that the resulting population structure can favour coopera-
tion.14 This argument invokes the well-known principle, integral to multilevel
selection theory, that grouping of individuals can facilitate the evolution of
cooperative behaviours that could not evolve in an unstructured population.
The suggestion is that this principle, when applied to the cancer cells within
a neoplasm, might explain the empirical observation that some cell clones
appear to cooperate with each other in tumour formation, rather than ex-
hibiting purely selfish behaviour. Note that in this application of multilevel
selection, the particles are the individual cancer cells and the collectives are
colonies (or clonal groups) of such cells, not organisms. That is, multilevel
selection is here invoked as part of the clonal evolution model’s explanation
of tumourigenesis. This is quite different from the idea that cancer involves
evolutionary conflict between cells and organisms.
Secondly, Lean and Plutynski ([2016]) also invoke multilevel selection in
the context of the clonal evolution model. Their argument is that cancer
progression should not be regarded as a purely individual-level selective pro-
cess; rather, group selection offers a useful perspective too—where a ‘group’
means a group of cancerous cells, or a whole tumour. Their reasons for say-
ing this are various; they include the idea that genetically distinct cancer cell
lineages can co-evolve with each other; that population structure within a
tumour could affect the outcome of somatic evolution (as per Aktipis’ sugges-
tion above); that properties of a tumour as a whole could affect the likelihood
of it invading other tissues; and that metastasis can be regarded as ‘repro-
duction by tumours’. These are interesting ideas; here is not the place to
14Similar arguments are found in (Cleary et al. [2014]; Axelrod et al. [2006]).
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assess their empirical validity.15 The key point to note is that when multi-
level selection is invoked in this way, it refers to a process that takes place
entirely within a single organism during the course of tumour progression;
this is very different from multilevel selection in the sense of a combination
of selection between cells within organisms and selection between organisms,
which is the target of the EDA.
To summarize, there are three uncontroversial ways in which evolutionary
principles can be applied to cancer: (i) to explain the incidence of germ-line
mutations that increase cancer risk; (ii) to explain why organisms evolved
anti-cancer adaptations; (iii) to explain the process of tumour development
via cell-lineage selection, as in the clonal evolution model. However points
(i)-(iii) do not in themselves vindicate the idea that cancer involves conflict
between levels of selection.
3 The Evolutionary Dead-End Argument
The EDA says that it is mistaken to conceptualize cancer in terms of conflict
between levels of selection, since cancer cells are not transmitted to future
organismic generations (except in very rare cases). Gardner’s and Shpak and
Lu’s defences of this argument are examined below. But firstly, one point
about non-tranmission should be noted. That cancer cells are not trans-
mitted is a highly contingent fact, not an intrinsic limitation, in the sense
that many cancer cells do possess indefinite replicative potential—unlike or-
dinary somatic cells in metazoan tissue—so can in principle outlive their
hosts. This point is stressed by Vincent ([2010]), who observes that cancer
cells ‘can regularly be cultured from host biopsies, propagated in vitro and
even transplanted serially into immunologically tolerant recipients, such as
nude mice, in the form of xenografts’ (p. 1177). Thus strictly speaking, we
should say that cancer cells are de facto not transmitted, rather than that
they are non-transmissible.
3.1 Gardner ([2015a], [2015b])
Gardner’s version of the EDA derives from his ‘genetical theory of multilevel
15See (Germain and Laplane [2017]) for critical discussion of Lean and Plutynski’s use
of multilevel selection, and (Plutynski [2018]) for further discussion.
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selection’. This is a general framework that Gardner develops for analysing
evolution in hierarchically structured systems, based around the Fisherian
concept of reproductive value (Fisher [1930]). The latter is a mathemat-
ical measure of the long-term evolutionary success of an allele, genotype,
or organism (roughly, its expected contribution to the future gene pool of
the population or species). Since all somatic cells, including cancer cells,
die when their host organism dies, these cells have zero reproductive value,
Gardner argues. So the proliferation of cancer cells within an organism does
not represent ‘selection in the strict sense’ (p. 6); thus cancer should not be
conceptualized as a form of conflict between levels of selection.
What should we make of this argument? In Gardner’s defence, applying
the concept of reproductive value to multilevel selection is perfectly defensi-
ble. The main point of that concept is to supply a fitness measure that takes
account of the fact that individuals in a population can vary in non-genetic
ways, so fall into distinct classes (age groups, sexes, castes), which may differ
in terms of their contribution to the future gene pool. The existence of class
structure means that simply counting offspring is an unsuitable measure of
an organism’s Darwinian fitness; the distribution of offspring across classes
matters too, which reproductive value takes account of. This general point
applies to multilevel no less than to single-level scenarios.
However, Gardner’s line of argument can be contested in at least three
ways. Firstly, certain multilevel selection phenomena arguably cannot be ac-
counted for from a genetic basis anyway, as they involve higher-level changes.
Arnold and Fristrup ([1982]) gave a striking example in which selection be-
tween species changes the composition of species within a single clade, but
without any underlying changes in gene frequency. Though not directly re-
lated to the issue of cancer and reproductive value, this point does suggest
that Gardner’s genetical theory may be unable to capture the full range
of evolutionary phenomena which multilevel selection has traditionally been
invoked to explain.
Secondly, Gardner’s argument, if correct, would seem to condemn not
just the idea that cancer involves multilevel selection but also the clonal
evolution model of tumourigenesis. For unless we allow that competition
between cell lineages within a neoplasm is a bona fide case of natural selection,
the empirical success of the clonal evolution model is hard to explain. Now
Gardner might reply that the differential proliferation of cancer cells (and
somatic selection more generally) is merely ‘selection-lite’, that is, a selection-
like phenomenon that falls short of being the real thing. (This is suggested
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by Gardner’s phrase ‘selection in the strict sense’, quoted above.) However,
this reply seems somewhat arbitrary; for the fundamental requirements for
evolution by natural selection—variation, heredity, and fitness differences—
are satisfied in cases of somatic selection no less than in cases of ‘ordinary’
natural selection.16
Thirdly, Gardner’s argument arguably proves too much, as can be seen
by frameshifting it up a level. Since over geological time, the vast majority of
species go extinct without leaving any daughter species, the organismal lin-
eages within them leave no long-term descendants either. But the organisms
within these species clearly do evolve by natural selection, during the species’
lifetimes. Now Gardner might reply that his genetical theory of multilevel
selection is inherently microevolutionary, focusing on allele frequency change
within a species, and thus that the relevant definition of ‘long-term’ does not
extend beyond a single species’ lifetime. But again, if this is right it suggests
that Gardner’s theory is not a wholly general analysis of multilevel selection.
Alternatively, Gardner might reply that it is merely a contingent fact that
most species will go extinct, so any given organism may leave descendants in
future species. However the force of this reply is dented by the point noted
above, that a cancer cell’s inability to outsurvive its host is also a contingent
limitation, and one that can be lifted artificially.
Where does this leave us? Gardner’s argument certainly poses a chal-
lenge to those who conceptualize cancer in terms of conflict between levels
of selection. However the case is not clear-cut; as there are a number of
defensible counterarguments, allied to doubts about the generality of Gard-
ner’s conception of multilevel selection. To make progress, let us turn to the
version of the EDA found in Shpak and Lu ([2016]). Their argument is a
development of Gardner’s but is not tied to the notion of reproductive value.
3.2 Shpak and Lu ([2016])
According to Shpak and Lu ([2016]), since somatic mutations are an evo-
lutionary dead-end, ‘multilevel selection (sensu stricto) on cancer is rarely
possible’ (p. 42). In support of this, they offer a general principle about what
is needed for ‘true’ multilevel selection. They write: ‘reducing the fitness of
one class of replicators through selection on replicators at another level of
16Goodnight ([2015]) objects to Gardner’s argument on precisely these grounds; but see
the reply by Gardner ([2015b]).
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organization is not sufficient for multilevel selection per se. In true multilevel
selection, the lower-level replicator has to have the potential to contribute
to the genotype or phenotype of the next generation (with respect to the
higher-level replicators generation time). This includes the potential to drive
genotype frequencies in opposite directions across generations’ (p. 42).
Shpak and Lu make an important point here. It is certainly true that in
many paradigm cases of multilevel selection, selection at the lower and the
higher levels can offset each other over the generation time of the higher-
level unit; and that therein lies much of the interest in this type of selection
process. Consider for example the famous case of the t-allele in the domestic
house mouse (Lewontin and Dunn [1960]). This allele is a selfish genetic
element which spreads at the expense of its host organism. Mice homozygotic
(t/t) for the allele die before reproducing; so at the level of the organism
the allele is selected against. But heterozygotes (t/+) transmit the t-allele
to 90% of their gametes, so at the gametic level the allele is selected for.
Thus the allele is maintained in the population by the two opposing selective
forces. As Shpak and Lu point out, nothing comparable happens in the
case of cancer. A mutation (germline or somatic) that causes cancer, and
so reduces the individual organism’s survival, cannot be maintained in a
population by the countervailing force of lower-level (somatic) selection; for
although the mutation may proliferate somatically within an organism, it is
not transmitted to the next (organismic) generation.
Shpak and Lu illustrate this point formally using the Price equation, a
standard tool for modeling multilevel selection.17 Letting z denote the fre-
quency of a gene in a population of organisms, the change in frequency over
a single (organismic) generation can be written as ∆z = Cov(w, z)/w +
Exp(wδ)/w, where w denotes fitness, w is average fitness, and δ measures
parent-offspring deviation in genotype. The Cov term is the covariance,
across individuals in the population, between fitness and genotype, so cap-
tures the effects of selection at the organismic level; while the Exp term
captures the changes arising from imperfect transmission, including lower-
level selection. Applied to the t-allele in mice, the Cov term is negative but
this is offset by a positive Exp term, thanks to gametic selection. But ap-
plied to a gene associated with cancer, matters are different. In this case,
the lower-level (somatic) selection, that is, the proliferation of somatic cells
17See (Price [1972]; Frank [1998]; Okasha [2006]) for discussion of the Price equation
and multilevel selection.
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containing the gene within an individual organism, will have no effect on the
Exp term, since somatic cells are not transmitted to the next generation.
This is an interesting argument. One possible response is to contest Shpak
and Lu’s criterion for ‘true’ multilevel selection. After all, multilevel selection
is a broad concept with a rather convoluted history, lacking a canonical
formulation that all parties agree on.18 In the macroevolutionary literature
on species and clade selection, for example, multilevel selection is usually
taken to mean the combination of selection on organisms within species and
differential extinction of species, processes which take place over very different
timescales19; so the effects of the lower-level selection are not necessarily
manifest over the generation time of the higher-level unit. In such cases
Shpak and Lu’s criterion will not always be satisfied.
How might Shpak and Lu reply? Conceivably, they could appeal to the
distinction between: (i) selection at multiple levels of a hierarchical system
contributing to a single evolutionary change (for example, change in allele
frequency across organismic generations); and (ii) selection at multiple lev-
els of a hierarchical system each leading to a different evolutionary change,
possibly with some causal interaction between them. The former involves
an evolutionary process driven by selection at more than one level; while
the latter involves a multiplicity of evolutionary processes, at different lev-
els, each driven by selection at its own level. More succinctly, (i) involves
a single process of multilevel selection, while (ii) involves multiple processes
of single-level selection (occurring at different levels). There is an important
logical difference here, however we wish to mark it.20 It is open to Shpak
and Lu to insist that multilevel selection of the sort that they are concerned
with is of type (i); and here their criterion is applicable.
However, once the debate has gone in the direction, the whole issue may
start to seem terminological, about how the term ‘multilevel selection’ should
be used. But in fact Shpak and Lu’s argument (and Gardner’s) raises deeper
issues than this. In particular, is the organizing framework of social evolu-
tion theory, including the explanations that it offers of selfishness, cheating,
18Compare the substantially different conceptions of multilevel selection found in (Sober
and Wilson [1998]; Frank [1998]; Okasha [2006]; Gould [2002]; Damuth and Heisler [1988];
Gardner [2015a]; Goodnight [2013]).
19See, for example, Brunet and Dootlittle ([2015]).
20The distinction between (i) and (ii) is in effect equivalent to the distinction between
‘MLS1’ and ‘MLS2’ introduced by Damuth and Heisler ([1988]) and elaborated by Okasha
([2006]).
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cooperation and conflict, applicable to cancer? Is the conflict between can-
cerous cells and the organism relevantly similar to other conflicts between
levels of selection? Is the analogy between suppression of cheats in social
groups and organisms’ anti-cancer adaptations, that many authors endorse,
a valid one? These are important conceptual questions, not to be resolved
by terminological fiat. It seems preferable, therefore, to set aside the issue
of what constitutes ‘true’ multilevel selection and to focus directly on these
questions.
Now the EDA strongly suggests that the answer to each of these questions
is ‘no’. For a corollary of Shpak and Lu’s point is the following. The sense in
which a selfish genetic element such as the t-allele is ‘selfish’, and the sense in
which a cancer cell (or a mutant gene within it) is ‘selfish’, are fundamentally
different. That is, although both the t-allele and the mutant cancer cell can
be said to benefit themselves at the expense of the organism, the meaning
of ‘benefit’ and the currency in which it is measured are different in the two
cases. In the former case, the currency is number of copies left in the next
organismic generation; in the latter, it is number of copies left in the organ-
ism’s somatic tissues (or rate of somatic proliferation). Thus it does indeed
seem misleading to think of cancer cells as selfish cheats, just as Shpak and
Lu argue. Further considerations in support of this are introduced below.
3.3 Further considerations on the EDA
There is increasing evidence that somatic mutations not only cause cancer,
but also other diseases that do not involve malignancy, including primary
immune deficiencies, hypertension, and various neurological disorders.21 Such
diseases are clearly harmful to the individual, just like cancer. Now if a
cancer cell is regarded as ‘selfish’ on the grounds that it benefits itself but
harms the organism, by parity of reasoning a somatic cell that causes non-
neoplastic disease should be regarded as ‘spiteful’, since it harms the organism
but does not benefit from an enhanced proliferation rate. (‘Spite’ is the
standard term in social evolution for a behaviour which imposes a fitness
cost on both actor and recipient.) Furthermore, since selection can work on
epigenetic as well as genetic variation, any somatic cell in healthy tissue that
is terminally differentiated could be regarded as ‘altruistic’: it has sacrificed
its own proliferation in order to perform somatic duties for the organism’s
21See (Li and Williams [2013]; Leija-Salazar et al. [2018]) for overviews.
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benefit. Similarly, a B cell in the immune system that undergoes clonal
expansion in response to an antigen can be regarded as ‘cooperative’, for it
enjoys enhanced proliferation and also benefits the organism. The oddity of
these conceptualizations, and the fact that the terms ‘spite’, ‘altruism’ and
‘cooperation’ are not generally applied in this way, should give further pause
to those who regard cancer as a form of cellular selfishness.
This consideration ties in with the point made in section 2, that the valid-
ity of the clonal evolution model cannot be used to rebut the EDA. We noted
that the clonal evolution model owes its explanatory success to its positing a
selective process between mutant cell lines within a neoplasm, not between
cancerous cells and other somatic cells within the whole organism. But it is
a selective process of the latter sort that would be needed to vindicate the
notion that cancerous cells are ‘selfish’, pursuing their own interests at the
expense of the rest of the soma. For this to make sense, we would need to
regard all the cells in a single organism as comprising a single population
undergoing selection, in which a cell’s ‘fitness’ is measured by its rate of mi-
totic division.22 But there seems no good reason to think in these terms, not
least because differences in mitotic division rates are (usually) under genomic
control. As noted above, there are many genetically and epigenetically-based
differences in somatic cell division rates that are not naturally interpreted as
a form of Darwinian selection, nor described in terms of social evolution con-
cepts. So the fact that cancer cells proliferate faster than normal cells, and
thereby harm the organism, does not vindicate the idea that there is a bona
fide Darwinian selection process occurring on the total population of cells
within an organism in which ‘fitter’ cancer cells outcompete ‘less fit’ somatic
22Here I concur with Godfrey-Smith ([2009]), who argues that the cells in a multicelled
organism do not form a ‘paradigm Darwinian population’, but for quite different reasons
(p. 56, pp. 102–3). Godfrey-Smith’s reason for saying this is that which cells in an embryo
become germ cells rather than somatic cells depends on position rather than intrinsic cell
character. This violates what Godfrey-Smith regards as a prerequisite for any set of
entities to form a Darwinian population, namely that fitness differences should depend on
intrinsic differences. Note that Godfrey-Smith is arguing against a putative application
of Darwinism to the population of cells in an organism in which the germ cells have high
fitness and the somatic cells low fitness—that is, in which cellular fitness is measured
by number of descendants in the next organismic generation. By contrast, I am arguing
against a putative application of Darwinism to the population of cells in an organism
in which the fittest cells are those with the highest somatic proliferation rate within the
organism. This latter application is the one that would have to be defensible, to vindicate
the idea that cancer cells are ‘selfish’ and somatic cells ‘altruistic’.
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cells.
This point illustrates the fact that the EDA has consequences not just
for how cancer is described but also for how it is explained. Recall the claim
that the behaviour of cancer cells is readily explicable given that they differ
genetically from normal cells. This oft-made claim is actually ambiguous as
between a proximate and an ultimate reading. On the proximate reading,
the claim is that the proximate explanation of why cancer cells proliferate
uncontrollably is that they harbour genetic mutations, which is unquestion-
ably true. But on the ultimate reading, the claim is that since cancer cells are
genetic mutants, their evolutionary interests no longer coincide with those of
the other cells in the organism, so we should expect them to abandon normal
somatic duties in favour of self-interested pursuits. Understood this way, the
claim relies on a social evolution principle, namely that coooperation is the
default expectation where entites are genetically identical but not otherwise.
But if the EDA is right, this social evolution principle has no relevance for
cancer. If it is wrong to think of cancer as a form of selfish cheating, then we
cannot regard uncontrolled proliferation as an adaptive strategy that ‘makes
sense’ for a cancer cell; so the fact that the cancer cell is a mutant does not
allow us to explain, in the sense of supply an evolutionary rationale for, its
behaviour; thus on the ultimate reading, the claim fails unless the EDA can
be successfully rebutted.
3.4 Upshot so far
Gardner and Shpak and Lu offer powerful arguments against the idea that
cancer involves multilevel selection. However their arguments are not deci-
sive, in part because they rely on conceptions of multilevel selection that are
contestable. To avoid the debate becoming semantic, it is best to sidestep
the issue of what ‘true’ multilevel selection is. Instead, we may construe the
EDA as an argument against viewing cancer as a form of cellular cheating,
and/or explaining it in terms of evolutionary conflict between cell and organ-
ism, and/or conceptualizing it in the framework of social evolution theory.
So construed, the argument is a powerful one, and poses a serious challenge
to these biologists who understand cancer in these terms. I turn next to what
I regard as the most promising way of meeting the challenge, which draws
upon the (presumed) link between cancer and the evolution of multicellular-
ity.
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4 Cancer and the Origins of Multicellularity
As we have seen, the notion that a mutant cancer cell in a modern organism
‘benefits’ from the uncontrolled proliferation that it causes is questionable,
given that it is an evolutionary dead-end. However, multicelled organisms as
we know them today have not always existed. Rather, they evolved gradually
from single-celled ancestors—a process that must have involved selection at
both the cell and organism levels.23 For this transition to multi-cellularity
to happen, the cells within an organism had to cooperate with each other,
surrender their reproductive rights, and perform somatic duties for the good
of the whole. In particular, for cellular differentiation—so crucial to embry-
onic development—to evolve, some cell lineages had to relinquish totipotency
and thus lose the capacity for unlimited proliferation. Organisms evolved a
variety of control mechanisms for ensuring that cells perform their somatic
duty correctly. Plausibly, cancer results when these mechanisms break down.
This suggests an alternative justification for regarding cancer cells as
‘cheats’, selfishly benefiting themselves at the expense of the organism. The
putative justification lies in facts about the deep evolutionary past, rather
than the present. That is, it is not the mere fact that cancer cells proliferate
faster than ordinary somatic cells in modern organisms that justifies this
conceptualization, but rather the fact that such uncontrolled proliferation
represents a reversion to a mode of living found in single-celled ancestors, for
whom it was beneficial, and which organisms had to suppress in order for
multicellularity to evolve. Similarly, the justification for viewing cancer as a
form of selective conflict between cell and organism lies in the fact that such
a conflict occurred in the evolutionary past, and that the mechanisms that
organisms evolved to control it are precisely those whose breakdown leads to
cancer today.
Two versions of this argument are explored below, that rest on different
empirical premises. The first draws on ideas from Leo Buss’s The Evolution
of Individuality (Buss [1987]). The second draws on the idea, popular in
the recent cancer literature, that neoplastic cells are atavistic, that is, have
reverted to an ancestral state. Both represent possible ways of justifying the
view that cancer involves cheating, and conflict between levels of selection,
despite cancer cells being an evolutionary dead-end.
23This is a prominent theme in the work of Buss ([1987]) and Michod ([1999], [2007]).
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4.1 Buss on germ-line sequestration
Buss’s 1987 book played a key role in the genesis of the literature on evo-
lutionary transitions, which studies how free-living biological units become
aggregated into larger units.24 Buss’s main focus was on the transition from
single-celled to multi-celled organisms (which he called ‘individuals’). He
advocated a levels-of-selection perspective, arguing that to understand the
transition in Darwinian terms, we need to invoke selection at both the cell
and organism levels, and the tension between them. Numerous aspects of
embryonic development in modern metazoa, Buss argued, bear testimony to
the ancestral conflict between selective levels.
One of Buss’s key claims was that during the evolution of multicellular-
ity, organisms faced a continual threat from ‘rogue’ cell lines that pursued
their own interests at the expense of the organism. He identified two organ-
ismic features that serve to contain this threat: maternal control of early
development and germ-line sequestration. The former refers to the fact that
the earliest stages of embryonic cell division are directed by the maternal
genotype, thus limiting the potential for mutant cell lines to disrupt devel-
opment. The latter refers to the fact that in most metazoan taxa, the future
germ cells are set aside, or sequestered, in early ontogeny. This is not a uni-
versal feature of multicellular life; plants do not sequester a germline, with
many tissues retaining the ability to give rise to a new plant.25 Buss argued
that animals evolved germ-line sequestration in order to limit the heritability
of selfish somatic mutants, that is, to prevent them from invading the germ
line. Plants had no need for this given that their rigid cell walls limit the
migration of cells within the organism.
The significance of this is the follows. If Buss’s hypothesis about the
evolution of germ-line sequestration is correct, then it follows that the non-
transmission of somatic mutants is itself an adaptation, an evolved mech-
anism to protect the integrity of the organism. And of course it is this
non-transmission that accounts for the fact that cancerous cell lineages are
evolutionary dead ends, incapable of passing on their mutated genomes to
24Other key works in this literature include (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry [1995]) and
(Michod [1999]), both of which were influenced by (Buss [1987]).
25Though see (Lanfear [2018]) for a recent re-evaluation of the claim that there is no
germ-line sequestration in plants.
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the next (organismic) generation. So if Buss is right, then the very feature
that, according to the EDA, makes it inappropriate to think of cancerous
cells as selfish cheats, is itself the result of an organismic adaptation that
evolved to prevent somatic cells from invading the germ-line.
This suggests that if we take an expanded evolutionary horizon, conceptu-
alizing cancerous cells as ‘cheats’ in conflict with their host organism makes
a certain amount of sense. For although cancer cells do not in fact reap
any long-term evolutionary benefit from the uncontrolled proliferation they
cause, if Buss is right then their behaviour is similar to that of the germ-
line invaders that threatened the earliest multicelled organisms, to which
organisms evolved germ-line sequestration in response. These ancient germ-
line invaders were genuine cheats, and were ‘selfish’ in precisely the sense
that selfish genetic elements are, since they were not evolutionary dead-ends;
that is, they did (when successful) reap a long-term advantage from their
behaviour. So the fact, if it is one, that cancer cells in modern organisms
behave similarly to these germ-line invaders justifies conceptualizing them as
cheats too.
It follows that if Buss’s theory is right, there is a rational response to
the EDA. The multilevel selection view of cancer is justified, despite the
fact that cancer cells are not transmitted, because the mechanism by which
their non-transmission is ensured—germ-line sequestration—itself arose as a
means to prevent selective conflict between organisms and their constituent
cells. Since the mechanism works almost perfectly (in those taxa in which it is
found), actual selective conflict between cells and organisms is today a rarity.
But mutant cells continually arise that exhibit the phenotypic features—
abandonment of somatic function and unlimited proliferation—that selected
for germ-line sequestration in the first place. Such cells are therefore akin to
selfish cheats, despite not reaping any long-term benefit from their behaviour,
since they behave in a way that would have brought such a benefit had it not
been for the evolved mechanism that prevents it from being realized. Thus
there is a principled reason for conceptualizing cancer in terms of conflict
between levels of selection, that does not stem merely from differences in
somatic proliferation rate.
Here it is worth noting the distinction, emphasized by Okasha ([2005],
[2006]), between ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’ approaches to the levels of se-
lection issue. The former concerns selection and adaptation at pre-existing
hierarchical levels, while the latter concerns the evolution of the biological hi-
erarchy itself. In critiquing the view that cancer involves multilevel selection,
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both Gardner and Shpak and Lu adopt a synchronic approach: their point
is that in organisms as they are now, somatic mutants are not transmitted.
This is of course true. However, a valid question is how organisms came to
be like this in the first place, that is, how they evolved those features that
prevent the transmission of somatic mutants. This is to adopt a diachronic
approach to the levels of selection—for in effect, it is to ask how it came to be
that cell-lineage selection was prevented from having long-term evolutionary
consequences, thus allowing organism-level selection to predominate. Buss’s
theory is an attempt to answer this question; to the extent that it is success-
ful, it vindicates the use of the mutlilevel selection framework, understood
diachronically, as an organizing tool with which to think about cancer.
If Buss’s theory on the origin of germ-line sequestration is true, the EDA
can thus be rebutted. But is Buss’s theory true? This is a controversial issue
on which no agreement exists, but a couple of points can be made. Firstly,
it is fairly clear that germline sequestration is an evolved attribute, for it is
not found in basal metazoan taxa (sponges and corals). Secondly, theoretical
models of the evolution of multicellularity suggest that Buss’s argument could
work. In particular, Michod and Roze ([1999]) have modeled the origins of
germ–soma separation. In one of their models, organisms initially reproduce
by sending out a propagule containing a random sample of the cells in the
adult. They show that if mutants arise that abandon somatic duties, this
selects for sequestration of the germ-line—as by preventing most cells from
entering the pool that gives rise to the next generation, organisms can reduce
the chance that harmful somatic mutants will be passed on. This suggests
that suppression of cell-lineage competition could indeed be the reason why
germline sequestration evolved, just as Buss argued.
Against this, both Maynard Smith ([1989]) and Queller ([2000]) have ar-
gued against Buss’s theory, on the grounds that cell-lineage competition can
be largely eliminated if the organism’s lifecycle passes through a single-celled
bottleneck—as in most metazoan taxa—since this ensures clonality of the
cells in the organism. Thus the function of germ-line sequestration lies else-
where, they argue, perhaps in protecting the germ cells from damage. Also,
Queller and Strassmann ([2013]) have argued that germ-line sequestration
may simply arise as a side-effect of some cell lineages altruistically adopting
somatic roles and undergoing differentiation, that is, the germ cells are the
ones left over. So no process of active exclusion of cells from the germline
need be posited, they argue. The jury is still out on this issue.
Finally, a complication should be noted. Buss’s book contains a num-
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ber of argumentative threads, intricately interwoven. Often, he does not
sharply distinguish between two ideas. The first is that in the early evolution
of multicellularity, organismic integrity was threatened by somatic variants
that abandoned somatic duty by failing to undergo terminal differentiation
and so enjoying an increased proliferation rate. The second is that organ-
ismic integrity was threatened by somatic variants that tried to invade the
germline.26 These ideas are not equivalent, since the sense in which the so-
matic variants ‘benefit’ is different in the two cases (short-term proliferation
versus increased frequency in the next organismic generation). The former
idea is fairly uncontroversial; it explains why organisms evolved mechanisms
to control cell division and anti-proliferative mechanisms such as apoptosis.
However it is the latter idea that would need to be true if germline seques-
tration represents an adaptation designed to limit the heritability of somatic
mutants, which is the aspect of Buss’s theory that allows a response to the
EDA.
To conclude, if Buss’s hypothesis on the origin of germline sequestration
is true, this entitles us to regard the non-transmission of somatic mutants,
including ones that cause cancer, as itself an adaptation designed to limit the
effects of selective conflict between cell and organism. This in turn justifies
conceptualizing cancer in terms of multilevel selection and / or social evolu-
tion, and thus meets the challenge posed by the EDA. However, since it is
unknown whether Buss’s hypothesis is true, there is a considerable empirical
hostage-to-fortune here.
4.2 Cancer as atavism
According to the atavistic interpretation, cancer does not represent a novel
phenotype, nor the result of a purely stochastic process, but rather a re-
version to a phylogenetically prior state. The single-celled eukaryotes from
which multicelled organisms evolved needed to be able to survive and pro-
liferate rapidly, especially during times of stress. During the transition to
multicellularity, this proliferative capacity needed to be controlled, so that
cells would work for the good of whole rather than pursuing their own inter-
26Thus for example Buss ([1987]) writes: ‘the organism is an environment potentially
populated by normal and variant cells. The variant must complete with the lineage from
which it arose for growth-enhancing substances and, ultimately, for access to the germ
line’ (p. 76). Here Buss moves seamlessly between the two ideas.
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ests. The control mechanism that evolved involved suppressing, rather than
eliminating altogether, the capacity for unlimited proliferation; and so the
cells of modern organisms retain that capacity. Cancer is what occurs when
the organism’s system of networked control fails, often as a result of mu-
tations to tumour suppressor genes, and thus represents a kind of atavistic
reversion to a unicellular mode of life.
The atavistic hypothesis, first advanced by Davies and Lineweaver ([2011]),
is supported by an impressive array of evidence. Many of the hallmarks
of cancer, such as escape from apoptotic control, resistance to signalling,
and uncontrolled proliferation, make sense once we think of them as cellu-
lar phenotypes that would have been adaptive for our single-celled ances-
tors (Greaves [2015]); and these phenotypes would have required suppression
in order for cohesive multicelled organisms to evolve. Moreover, there is
evidence that the genes that are implicated in causing cancer today have
phlyogenetic origins that are associated with the initial emergence of multi-
cellularity (Cisneros et al. [2017]); this suggests that these genes evolved to
facilitate cellular cooperation, and organismic control over cell division, dur-
ing the transition from single to multi-celled life. Finally, recent molecular
studies have found that in many tumours, genes of known unicellular origin
are preferentially expressed vis-à-vis genes of metazoan origin (Trigos et al.
[2017]); this too supports the idea that cancerous cells exhibit phenotypes
characteristic of the unicellular ancestors of the metazoa.
The atavistic hypothesis, as understood here, involves two claims. The
first is that cancer cells express phenotypes characteristic of our single-celled
ancestors; the second is that multicellular organisms evolved control mecha-
nisms whose function it was to suppress these phenotypes, and whose break-
down leads to cancer today. These two claims are logically separable; that
cancer cells exhibit phenotypic reversion does not necessarily imply that there
was direct selection for suppression of the phenotypic behaviours in ques-
tion.27
The atavistic hypothesis, if true, furnishes a plausible response to the
EDA. To see this, note firstly that it is fairly clear, and widely accepted, that
the evolutionary transition from unicellularity to multicellularity involved
conflict between levels of selection.28 That is, the transition required that
27An anonymous referee notes that a single-celled bottleneck (if present) may have been
largely sufficient to limit cell-organism conflicts during the evolution of multicellularity,
but may have evolved for reasons unrelated to conflict-suppression.
28For discussion of how the levels of selection issue relates to evolutionary transitions,
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free-living or ‘selfish’ cells sacrifice their individuality and become part of
the collective; and this required that cells’ activities, including the process of
cell division, be brought under organismic control. Thus for the transition
to occur, organism-level selection had to trump cell-level selection; and cells
had to evolve cooperative behaviours.
Now when this well-known point is combined with the atavistic hypoth-
esis, a rationale emerges for conceptualizing cancer in terms of evolutionary
conflict, despite the fact that cancer cells are not transmitted. For if cancer
involves a reversion to a unicellular mode of life, as per the atavistic hypoth-
esis, then it follows that cancer cells exhibit the very selfish phenotypes that
had to be suppressed in order for metazoa to evolve; and whose suppres-
sion involved selection at the organism level trumping selection at the cell
level. Therefore, although a cancer cell enjoys only a short-term proliferative
advantage, the cellular mechanisms it employs to reap that advantage are
similar to those found in its unicelled ancestors (and may depend on homol-
ogous genes). These unicelled ancestors were selfish in the literal sense, and
their selfishness had to be curtailed in order for cohesive multicelled organ-
isms to evolve. Thus there is a justification for regarding a cancer cell in a
modern organism as ‘cheating’, undermining the collective for its own benefit,
despite being an evolutionary dead-end; since its phenotypic characteristics
are objectively similar to those of its unicellular ancestors who really did be-
have selfishly, and whose selfish tendencies were suppresed in the transition
to multicellularity.
The atavistic hypothesis thus furnishes us with a principled reason for ap-
plying concepts and descriptors from social evolution theory to cancer, and
thus constitutes a response to the EDA. It is a stronger response that the
Buss-inspired response of the previous subsection, for two reasons. Firstly,
the atavistic hypothesis arguably enjoys stronger empirical support than
Buss’s hypothesis. Secondly, there is one aspect of the EDA that the Buss-
inspired response does not speak to but the atavistic idea does. This is the
analogy between organism’s anti-cancer adaptations and the policing mech-
anisms found in social insect colonies.
To see why, note that if Buss’s hypothesis is true, then germ-soma se-
questration certainly counts as a suppression mechanism designed to limit
the impact of rogue somatic cells. However, the analogy that Shpak and Lu
see (Maynard Smith [1989]; Michod [1999]; Okasha [2005]; Godfrey-Smith [2009]; Birch
[2018]).
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([2016]) reject concerns organismic features such as apoptosis and immune
system attack on nascent tumours—it is these, rather than germ-line seques-
tration, that are often analogized to worker policing in social insects. But
Buss’s hypothesis does not vindicate this analogy. Worker policing is a means
by which worker sterility is enforced, and thus by which the colony-level ana-
logue of germ-soma division—reproductive division-of-labour between queen
and workers—is maintained. But apoptosis (for example) is not a means for
reinforcing germ-soma division in metazoa, but rather a means for prevent-
ing cells engaging in unlimited proliferation to the detriment of the organism.
That is, the function (or a function) of apoptosis is to prevent rogue somatic
cells from harming the organism, but not necessarily to prevent them from
invading the germ-line. Thus the analogy between apoptosis and worker
policing does not go through, even supposing the truth of Buss’s hypothesis.
If the atavistic hypothesis is true, however, then the analogy is defensi-
ble. For the various control mechanisms that organisms use to regulate cell-
division (such as apoptosis), and whose breakdown leads to cancer, can then
be seen as adaptations for suppressing cellular phenotypes that are detrimen-
tal to the collective, but that would have been beneficial to the unicellular
ancestors in which those phenotypes first arose. And this is precisely the
functional role that mechanisms such as worker policing play in social insect
colonies: the colony needs to suppress the behaviour of workers, such as their
egg-laying tendencies, in order for colony benefit to be optimized. So on the
atavistic hypothesis, there is an isomorphism of functional role between at
least some of an organism’s anti-cancer adaptations and the policing mech-
anisms found in social insect colonies. By contrast, on the Buss hypothesis,
this analogy is a weak one, given that the function of anti-cancer adaptations
is not to protect the organism against germ-line invasion.
5 Conclusion
Over the last three decades, evolutionists have come to realize that the core
themes of social evolution theory, such as cooperation versus conflict, kinship
and multilevel selection, have a wider domain of application than was orig-
inally envisaged. Whenever there are fitness-affecting interactions between
biological units, and whenever smaller units are nested within larger ones,
these themes potentially become relevant. In particular, social evolution
theory has proved indispensable for understanding how biological collectives,
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including chromosomes, eukaroytic cells, insect colonies and multicelled or-
ganisms, evolved in the first place, and how their cohesiveness is maintained
given the potential conflicts of interest among their constituent sub-units.29
The generality and reach of social evolution theory is undeniably impres-
sive. But there is an attendant risk, namely that certain biological phenom-
ena are viewed through the lens of social evolution when they should not
be. This is not merely a hypothetical possibility. In an article entitled ‘Mi-
crobes are not bound by sociobiology’, Rainey et al. ([2013]) have argued
persuasively that terms and concepts from social evolution theory, such as
‘cheating’ and ‘public good’, have been misappropriated in studies of bacte-
rial sociality, with harmful consequences. In particular, Rainey et al. object
to the practice of using the term ‘public good’ to refer to any extracellular
metabolite secreted by a microbe, irrespective of whether it is actually costly
to produce or beneficial to others. An a priori commitment to the social
evolution framework appears to be the source of this confusing practice.
The issue we have examined in this paper is similar, in that it centers
on whether cancer should be viewed through the social evolution lens, and
in particular on whether cancer is correctly conceptualized as a conflict be-
tween levels of selection. As noted in section 1, many cancer researchers do
think and talk this way. However, the EDA as outlined by Gardner ([2015a])
and Shpak and Lu ([2016]), plus the supporting considerations introduced
in section 3, pose a powerful challenge to this practice. This challenge can-
not be met simply by appeal to the clonal evolution model of cancer, nor
by invoking the fact that cancer cell lineages proliferate faster than normal
somatic ones. However, in section 4 we examined an alternative justification
for regarding cancer cells as selfish cheats benefiting themselves at the ex-
pense of the organism, that derives from facts (or assumptions) about the
deep evolutionary past. Two versions of this argument were explored, one
stemming from Buss’s theory on the evolution of multicellularity, the other
from the cancer-as-atavism hypothesis. In prinicple, either version permits
a well-motivated response to the EDA, contingent on the relevant empirical
facts being true. However, the atavistic hypothesis appears more promising.
Finally, the methodology employed in this paper deserves brief comment.
We began by noting that cancer is often viewed as a conflict between se-
lective levels, and the objection to this posed by the EDA. We then asked
29See, for example, (Queller and Strassmann [2009]; Bourke [2011]; Maynard Smith
[1989]; Birch [2018]).
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what the world would have to be like in order for this view of cancer to be
defensible. In effect, then, our enquiry has sought to determine the empir-
ical preconditions that would have to be met in order to justify a certain
way of describing, explaining and conceptualizing a particular phenomenon
(cancer). These preconditions are not self-evident, but took some work to
uncover. I suggest that the same may be true in other cases. Examining
the empirical preconditions of a particular area of scientific discourse, or a
particular explanatory practice, may be a fruitful technique for philosophers
of science to use, especially when the discourse or explanatory practice is
contested.
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